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Executive Summary 
This briefing paper reports on an illustrative analysis of how energy efficiency improvement programmes 
in the UK may impact across the wider economy. We explore how the implementation of residential 
energy efficiency actions funded through the Energy Company Obligation, ECO, triggers a range of 
impacts and interactions in and between different sectors and actors in the UK economy. We then 
consider how outcomes may differ if alternative funding approaches were to be adopted, with the aim of 
providing useful insight to a wider stakeholder community concerned with energy efficiency policy. 
Supporting household energy efficiency improvements enables households to use less energy and to 
reduce their spending on energy bills. The real income gains and changes in spending trigger a process 
of wider economic expansion that could be important in justifying public spending to help deliver support 
for efficiency programmes. Our simulation analyses show that energy efficiency gains will generally trigger 
expansionary processes, but the nature and extent of impacts on household incomes, GDP and 
employment depend, among other things, on how we enable efficiency gains.  
For example, our results suggest that the retrofitting activity supported by the current UK ECO programme 
has the potential to deliver a GDP expansion of up to 0.02% above what it would otherwise be and support 
just under 6,500 full-time equivalent (FTE) jobs. However, these economic gains are temporary and begin 
to erode after the programme ends. On the other hand, households actually realise energy efficiency 
gains of 17.2% per beneficiary household, equating to an average of 2.38% energy saving across the 
household sector. This releases more disposable income to spend on other things, triggering further 
expansion across the economy. Ultimately, by enabling energy efficiency gains, we estimate that ECO 
may ultimately support a sustained GDP boost of up to 0.07% and just over 19,500 FTE jobs across a 
wide range of sectors in the UK economy. With approximately £10.9billion spent on ECO, over time (but 
with only £4.2billion actually going to efficiency improvements) this translates to a societal return of 1.8 
jobs and £2.3million of cumulative GDP gains (by 2040) per £million spent. 
So is ECO is the best mechanism for maximising residential energy efficiency gains and the economic 
expansion that results? The key problem is that ECO, as a centralised scheme run through the major 
energy suppliers, involves several types of non-retrofitting costs. Administrative and search costs 
increase the total cost passed to consumers, while the potential presence of large economic rent can 
further reduce the funds directed to the industries and supply chains delivering efficiency improvements.  
We consider a second scenario where there is no economic rent present in the ECO system. Here, in the 
retrofitting stage alone, results suggest that GDP gains could reach 0.04% above the pre-efficiency 
programme levels, supporting around 11,450 new full-time equivalent jobs. If we introduce consideration 
of the impacts of households actually realising energy efficiency gains, each beneficiary household still 
requires 17.2% less energy, but with more funds (8.2billion) directed to efficiency gains, the average 
improvement increases to 4.64% per UK household. As household spending on energy bills falls, the 
boost from increased real incomes and reallocated spend can now grow to support a sustained GDP 
boost of 0.14% and 37,400 FTE jobs. That is, the societal return per £million of ECO spending could 
ultimately reach 3.4 FTE jobs and £4.4million in additional (cumulative) GDP by 2040.   
We also consider whether an alternative type of funding scheme may deliver greater benefits than ECO. 
The centralised nature of ECO is in itself a source of potential inefficiency. If households seeking energy 
efficiency gains are able to search for and resource suppliers themselves to implement retrofitting at 
individual project level, the type of ‘leakage’ considered above is likely to be reduced, with the implication 
that more funds can be directed towards achieving more efficiency improvements. In two alternative 
scenarios, we assume that the total amount spent falls to £9.8billion but is entirely directed to energy 
efficiency improvements. We consider two ways in which such a decentralised approach may be 
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resourced. One possibility involves ensuring that households have access to loans. Another is to entirely 
socialise the costs through grants funded by taxation (here income tax).  
By employing either of these funding options each beneficiary household still becomes 17.2% more 
energy efficient, but now this equates to an average energy saving of 5.66% per UK household. Our 
simulations suggest that, while in the shorter term taxpayers fund the energy efficiency programme, over 
time economic expansion driven by greater efficiency allows more than a 1:1 return back to the taxpayer. 
Thus, socialising the cost via income tax ultimately frees up more household income and delivers the 
greatest net wider economy gains over the long-term, potentially delivering a sustained 0.25% boost to 
GDP compared to pre-efficiency programme levels, supporting over 64,700 full-time equivalent jobs. That 
is, the societal return per £million of spending could ultimately reach 6.6 FTE jobs and £6.7million in 
additional (cumulative) GDP by 2040. Funding through loans (here, for simplicity, assuming an extreme 
of zero interest) could also deliver greater gains than ECO, with our scenario simulations suggesting a 
potential sustained GDP expansion of up to 0.17% associated with just over 45,200 FTE jobs. However, 
in either case, it is crucial to consider these societal returns in the context of whether the full energy 
efficiency gains required to deliver them would actually be realised in a decentralised context. If not, the 
economy-wide gains will be smaller and individual households may suffer net losses in some timeframes. 
It is also important to consider distributional impacts. For example, if costs are fully socialised through 
income tax, lower income households will initially gain at the expense of mid-to-high income groups. The 
precise nature of distributional impacts also depends on access to funding. For example, the outcomes 
reported above assume an equal distribution of/access to funds. We reconsider the case where costs 
are fully socialised, but focus on a scenario where the 20% of households on the lowest incomes receive 
most (54%) of the grant support and the 20% of households with the highest incomes the least (2%). The 
outcome is that real income gains to the average household in the lowest income group grow by over 
£30 per year, but this is at the cost of more constrained macroeconomic gains, and this is associated 
with around 5,300 fewer FTE jobs sustained into the long term.  
Key messages: Trade-offs need to be considered when designing an energy efficiency policy. Some key 
messages emerging from the analysis are: 
• As with any investment activity, the retrofitting/projects supported by ECO can deliver economy-wide 
benefits and boost to the incomes of the lowest income households even if no efficiency gains are 
actually realised. However, these will be limited, both over time and relative to the fuller societal 
returns achievable from households reducing their energy bills and devoting increased real purchasing 
power to other goods and services. The magnitude of the gains is dependent on the presence or not 
of rent. Moreover, search and administrative costs erode the benefits achievable if the same amounts 
are used for directly improving the efficiency of dwellings.  
• Crucially, however, while gains from ECO may be limited relative to alternative funding mechanisms, 
our findings strongly suggest that the net impacts of the ECO programme will be positive in all 
timeframes for lower income households and for the economy as a whole. This is not so clearly or 
generally true in the case of either of the alternative funding approaches considered. Alternative 
funding mechanisms such as using loans or socialising the cost through income tax may deliver better 
outcomes in terms of boosting GDP, employment and household incomes. However, if the efficiency 
gains are not realised, there is the potential for transitory but significant economy-wide and net 
household income losses in some timeframes.  
• Distributing access to funding equally across all household quintiles enables the best economy-wide 
results but a tapered distribution can deliver better income boost for the lowest income households. 
This is explained simply by the fact that more affluent households consume more and, thus, trigger a 
greater economic stimulus if they are able to increase efficiency in their energy use.  
Thus, our analysis demonstrates the need to trade off policy objectives and priorities in considering the 
best means of supporting energy efficiency programmes. The results of the scenario simulations reported 
here demonstrate that that there is no single approach that enables both the best sustained economy-
wide outcomes and the largest income boost for the lowest income households while ensuring that there 
is no potential for any negative impacts in any timeframe. The key ‘takeaway’ message is the need for 
policy makers to clearly define and prioritise the goals of energy efficiency policies before selecting the 
combination of funding approaches and the access distribution therein.  
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I: Introduction 
In this policy briefing, we report the results of an illustrative analysis of the potential impacts of residential 
energy efficiency achieved across the UK economy. We focus specific attention on the real income of UK 
households. We use a Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) model for the UK, which allows us to 
capture impacts on GDP and employment across all the sectors of the UK economy driven by a 
programme that enables residential energy efficiency gains through retrofitting of properties. Some key 
features of the model we use are detailed in Annex A. We explore a range of different scenarios with the 
core one being the impact of the Energy Company Obligation (ECO) with and without the presence of 
economic rent. The alternative scenarios we analyse involve broad resetting to a decentralised 
programme, where households directly manage and transact efficiency actions. This involves one 
scenario where loan funding is used and another where costs are fully socialised through the income tax 
system (both with a varying distribution of access to grant funding). 
Our model is based on 2010 UK national statistics arranged in a Social Accounting Matrix, which provides 
information on the interactions between UK sectors, imports, exports and monetary transfers both within 
the UK and between the UK and abroad. Key features of the model are detailed in Annex A. Our scenarios 
are based on the GB energy efficiency projects supported through ECO, as reported in relevant 
government publications up to 2018 and estimates for the period beyond 2018. We also use data from 
government publications to estimate the average efficiency improvement per UK household. The funding 
breakdown in each of our scenarios, along with a summary of the main results, can be found at Annex B. 
This briefing is structured as follows. In Section II we focus on ECO, the potential impact that ECO-projects 
can drive and how the outcomes differ if economic rent is present or not. In Section III we consider 
alternative funding mechanisms to ECO and how their potential outcomes compare to those delivered by 
ECO. In Section IV, we shift our attention on how different distribution of access to funds can affect the 
expected results. Section V summarises our conclusions.  
II: Modelling the economy-wide 
impacts of ECO 
ECO came into being across the UK in 2013. 
Since then there have been 4 versions: ECO1; 
ECO2; ECO Help to Heat (HtH); and the current 
version ECO3. ECO1&2 lasted for just over 2 
years, ECO HtH just over one year and ECO3 is 
planned to last for 3.5 years.  
To date the expectation has been that each 
round of ECO will be followed by a new one. This 
is despite the relatively short timeframe of, and 
time gaps between, the different 
implementations. This indicates an effective 
management of expectations around ECO, which 
is crucial, particularly in the context of supply 
chain actors servicing energy efficiency 
programmes. Expectations over the future of the 
programme govern whether the firms involved in 
the delivery of ECO measures continue to 
allocate resources to support new rounds. If 
industries like Construction lose faith on the 
future of ECO then they, and their supply chains, 
could start reallocating their resources towards 
other activities. For the purpose of the research 
reported here, we focus on a case where all 
producers expect a continuing (16-year) ECO to 
be a standalone programme with no successor 
past 2028. On this basis, firms do not start to 
reallocate their resources away from delivery of 
ECO until near the end of the programme. 
Another key characteristic of ECO is the variety of 
costs associated with the delivery of energy 
efficiency projects. For ECO3 it is expected that 
40% of the funds will cover installation costs, 
10% various administrative costs, 12% search 
costs. According to data provided for this study 
(Annex A), the other 38% effectively become an 
economic rent. Here we assume that this 
accrues to suppliers who can deliver projects at 
a cost lower than the average price charged.1 In 
short, the cost of delivering efficiency gains 
through ECO is inflated by non-installation costs. 
Take the search costs, for example. Because 
delivering efficiency gains through ECO is an 
obligation for energy suppliers, they need to find 
appropriate projects to support in order to meet 
this obligation. This generates search costs that 
are (as with other costs associated with 
delivering ECO) passed on to consumers through 
energy bills. At the same time, there are fixed 
prices for particular retrofitting activities covered 
by ECO, regardless of their actual cost. In short, 
energy companies essentially act as a 
centralised supplier of energy efficiency 
measures. Moreover, there is room for 
significant economic rent. Some of this may be 
absorbed by activities necessary for the 
4 
retrofitting, but which do not improve energy 
efficiency (e.g. cleaning services after the 
retrofitting) but can also enable the extraction of 
large profits by the retrofitters. 
How does all this affect the type of wider 
economy returns that may justify continued 
public support of a programme like ECO to 
deliver residential energy efficiency gains? We 
use a multi-sector economy-wide computable 
general equilibrium (CGE) model, UKENVI (see 
Annex A), to explore the impacts of ECO to the UK 
economy. We do this in two stages to consider 
two distinct ways in which impacts transpire over 
time. First, we model the retrofitting activity of 
ECO, which we refer to as the enabling stage. We 
assume that the enabling stage lasts for a period 
of 16 years (2013-2028) with a total cost, based 
on available data and projections, of 
£10.9billion. Table 1 in Annex A details what we 
assume about the allocation of these funds.2  
In summary, approximately £7billion is spent on 
the output of the UK Construction sector (to 
cover the actual retrofitting work, but with the 
potential for rent to be extracted from this 
amount). A further £1.3billion is spent on 
purchases of boilers, where 75% of this is 
spending with UK suppliers. We do not model the 
production of the other 25% of the boilers that 
are imported, but we do model spending on them 
by UK households. Thus in total, we take the 
direct spending on enabling efficiency gains to 
be a sum of £8.3billion. The remaining 
£2.6billion are administrative and search costs. 
We use data from the 2019 edition of the 
Household Energy Efficiency Statistics to 
determine this breakdown. We assume that 
access to funding is equally distributed across all 
households throughout the duration of the 
programme. We consider an alternative 
approach in distributing access to funding in 
Section IV of this briefing. 
We then consider what we call the realising 
stage. That is, households realising efficiency 
gains will reduce their energy bills, boosting and 
freeing up real income to spend on other things.3 
The information regarding the improvement 
achieved through ECO are taken from the 2019 
edition of the National Energy Efficiency Data 
framework (see Annex A). We use these data to 
estimate an average efficiency improvement 
equating to each more efficient household 
requiring 17.2% less physical energy to run their 
homes. However, not every household in each 
quintile will receive an efficiency improvement so 
that his equates to, for example, in our first 
scenario an average energy saving of just 2.38% 
per UK household (where only 3.6million out of 
27.2million UK households receive efficiency 
improvements). Crucially, depending on the 
presence of economic rent or not, the number of 
households receiving an efficiency gain (and, 
thus, the UK household average energy saving) 
may fluctuate quite significantly. This is due to 
the fact that not all spending is directed to 
actually deliver energy efficiency (which we 
consider to be the physical amount of energy 
required to deliver a given level of energy 
services).  
For the scenarios modelled here, with access to 
funds equally distributed, the data suggest that 
the projects supported by ECO on average help 
the UK household sector to use 2.38% (when a 
large economic rent is present) or 4.64% (when 
there is no rent) less physical energy to run their 
homes. This boosts real household incomes and 
drives a reallocation of spending, which triggers 
a sustained demand driven expansion across the 
wider economy. This adds to any time-limited 
gains realised in the enabling stage (driven by 
spending on retrofitting and equipment).  
The economy-wide impacts of ECO 
Here we explain and consider how each (and 
both) the enabling and realising stages of these 
residential energy efficiency gains impact across 
the wider economy due to changes in demand 
patterns and levels, and real income. We 
consider the enabling stage first, to isolate the 
impacts of retrofitting activity and the purchase 
of boilers. But this then enables the realising 
stage, where efficiency gains are actually 
realised and household real incomes are 
affected through this process. The two stages will 
unfold alongside one another and this is 
reflected in our reporting of the realising stage. 
We find that a key factor determining the impact 
of  ECO is what happens in terms of extraction of 
economic rent. In the best-case scenario, there 
is no economic rent. This means that, in enabling 
energy efficiency improvements, the entirety of 
the non-admin non-search funds are directed 
(during the enabling stage) to UK Construction 
sector and boiler manufacturers, imports of 
boilers and also sectors that provide inputs 
necessary to facilitate wall insulation, boilers etc.  
Generally, the boost in demand for UK 
production in enabling energy efficiency 
improvements will enable a larger expansion 
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rippling across the wider economy. On the other 
hand, if this causes prices to rise (i.e. we assume 
that capacity in labour and capital markets is 
constrained) there will be some ‘crowding out’ of 
some other activity, which will dampen any net 
gains. For a disturbance of the size considered 
here, the main impacts of crowding out will be at 
sectoral rather than macroeconomic level. While 
investment relaxes the capital constraint over 
time, we assume a fixed national labour supply. 
Thus, any boost in overall employment is only 
possible due to the presence of a pool of 
unemployed labour. The base year structural 
data report a 6% unemployment rate but the 
maximum labour supply expansion from our 
scenarios only reduces this to 5.76% over the 
long term, reflecting relatively small pressure on 
the labour capacity constraint.   
The Enabling Stage 
It is useful to consider the economy-wide impacts 
of ECO by building up through the enabling and 
realising stages, given that these trigger different 
types of expansionary processes, and only the 
latter has sustained impacts. Taking the 
enabling stage first, we estimate that, in the 
best-case scenario (where no economic rent is 
extracted) ECO projects themselves (before they 
deliver any efficiency gains) may trigger a 
maximum GDP boost of £553million in 2023. 
This expansion also supports 11,451 additional 
full-time equivalent (FTE) jobs in the same year. 
By 2040, the cumulative GDP gains (again, 
attributable to the enabling stage alone) are 
£6.6billion. [Note that all monetary values are 
reported in the 2010 prices of the UKENVI base 
year dataset – see Annex A].  
Conversely, if we assume that a large economic 
rent is present, the 2023 gains in GDP and 
employment attributable to the enabling stage 
will be eroded to £308million (0.02% greater 
than it would otherwise be) and 6,357 jobs. The 
cumulative GDP gains by 2040 are eroded to 
£3.8billion. These results reflect the importance 
of minimising the presence of economic rent and 
ensuring that available resources are used to 
retrofit as many properties as possible. Of 
course, we do not suggest that the potential for 
rent can be entirely removed in practice. Rather 
the aim of our simulation exercises is to indicate 
just how much potential additional expansion 
may be gained in the absence of rent extraction. 
Here the results suggest that rent leads to the 
potential to lose over half of the potential 
economy-wide benefits that could be otherwise 
achievable.  
We emphasise that the gains achieved should be 
considered in net terms. The implementation of 
ECO leads to price increases for the energy used 
by households (i.e. higher energy bills) and, as a 
result, it directly affects household incomes 
before any efficiency gains are even considered. 
Depending on the presence (or not) of rent, there 
is variation in how different household quintiles 
are affected (we model from the 20% 
households on the lowest incomes up to the 20% 
on the highest incomes). In the worst-case 
scenario, where 37% of resources leak from 
spending into economic rent, the lowest and 
highest income quintiles (HG1 and HG5) are the 
only ones that do not experience any negative 
income changes, but for different reasons. HG1 
tends to have smaller energy bills in absolute (£) 
terms. Thus, they cover a smaller share of the 
costs of ECO. On the other hand, HG5 has much 
larger energy bills but, at the same time, they 
own more of the production capital and extract 
higher wages for labour services. That is, 
households in HG5 gain more when the economy 
expands. In our simulations, the retrofitting 
activity delivers sufficient employment and 
capital gains to help HG5 offset any negative 
income changes from the higher energy price. 
HG2-4 experience net negative income changes 
but only temporarily. On the other hand, in the 
absence of economic rent, our simulations 
suggest that only households in the quintile with 
the second highest incomes, HG4, will 
experience temporary (for a single year) net 
income losses. 
Introducing the Realising Stage 
So far we have focussed on the impacts that 
triggered by the fact that an energy efficiency 
programme like ECO will involve spending on 
activities such as retrofitting homes and 
installing new boilers. This is basically a demand 
shock to the economy through a form of 
domestic investment activity, the impacts of 
which will be time-limited. However, while 
investment programmes are sometimes used to 
stimulate the economy, the main purpose of a 
programme like ECO is to enable energy 
efficiency gains. The real stimulus to the UK 
economy comes from the fact that what happens 
at the enabling stage allows households to use 
less energy, reduce their energy bills and use any 
savings and real income gains in spending on 
other things. This is what ultimately delivers a 
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sustained boost to the UK economy. It will start 
to happen concurrently with the enabling stage 
but will substantially outlast it. In this section we 
introduce consideration of the impacts this 
realising stage in combination with those 
discussed above as attributable to the initial 
enabling stage.  
When we incorporate consideration of the fuller 
impacts of households actually realising energy 
efficiency gains, there are important changes to 
the observed results. At this realising stage, the 
boost to the UK economy is triggered by the fact 
that more energy efficient households have 
lower energy bills. Thus, they have increased real 
income to spend on a range of things. It is this 
that triggers a second round of demand-driven 
expansion, but one where the further stimulus 
may add to price pressures emerging from the 
first trigger of the enabling stage. 
The sustained longer term outcome of the 
enabling and realising improved energy 
efficiency is the delivery of net income gains for 
all UK households, regardless of the presence of 
rent. These are sufficient to completely offset 
any negative income changes for HG2-4 
associated with the enabling stage, and also 
help deliver greater income boosts to HG1 and 
HG5. HG1 experiences the largest percentage 
long-term income gains, while HG5 experiences 
the smallest ones. However, the size of the 
income boosts is linked to the size of the 
efficiency gains. Therefore, a large economic 
rent extraction leads to smaller income gains as 
it restricts the efficiency gains realised. 
The energy bill savings and real income gains 
from the efficiency improvement are what can 
deliver a sustained expansion to the UK 
economy. Of course, this requires that 
households actually spend a significant share of 
their savings/real income gains on the 
consumption of UK produced goods and 
services. Here, we assume that households 
increase spending in line with their initial 
distribution of income between savings and 
spending (i.e. the marginal propensity to save is 
unchanged). Similarly, we assume that spending 
on different goods and services expands in line 
with households’ initial allocations, but with the 
model capturing the impacts of changes in 
relative prices (on different domestic and 
imported goods).  
The results of our scenario analyses suggest that 
in the worst-case scenario UK GDP is bosted by 
0.07% above what would be otherwise. A net 
increase of 19,567 new sustained full-time jobs 
is observed. As highlighted above, this is the 
case where there is significant economic rent. If 
we consider the employment outcomes against 
the £10.9billion spent as part of ECO we see that 
there is a societal return of 1.8 jobs per £million 
spent (see first column of the summary results 
Table reported for key scenarios in Annex B). 
In the absence of economic rent, larger amounts 
are used directly to retrofit properties. Thus, 
households realise greater efficiency gains and 
bigger income boosts, which in turn enable 
bigger economy-wide benefits. We estimate that 
such a scenario could be achieved, UK GDP 
could expand by 0.14% above what it would 
otherwise be over time. Figure 1 shows the 
difference that is driven by the presence or not 
of rent and how the results of ECO compare to 
the alternatives we consider below (where by 
definition rent is absent). Overall, the 
combination of retrofitting and efficiency gains 
helps deliver (when a large rent is extracted) 
£25.4billion cumulative GDP gains by 2040. This 
equates to £2.3million of cumulative GDP gains 
per £million spent. This is over 6 times the 
amount delivered by retrofitting activity alone. In 
the absence of rent, the combination of the 
enabling and realising stages enable cumulative 
2040 GDP gains of £48.1billion, £4.4million in 
additional cumulative GDP per £million spent 
and over 7 times the amount delivered by just 
the enabling stage. These findings emphasise 
the importance of actually realising energy 
efficiency gains in delivering a ‘return’ to the 
wider economy, but also of simulating scenarios 
on a case-by-case basis. That is, there is no 
simple multiplier relationship between 
investment spending and GDP/employment 
outcomes). 
Considering the employment impacts, our 
analysis shows that in the absence of economic 
rent there could be a net increase of 37,410 new 
sustained full-time jobs. In this case, for the 
same £10.9billion spent, the societal return, in 
terms of employment per £million of ECO 
spending, could ultimately reach 3.4 FTE jobs. 
This is achieved largely through the economy 
drawing on the pool of unemployed labour, with 
only energy supply sectors suffering net job 
losses (see Figure 2 below). 
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III: Modelling alternatives to ECO 
The main challenge for ECO is how both 
efficiency and other economic gains are limited 
by the large non-installation costs that inflate the 
costs passed on to the consumers. Thus, we also 
consider potential alternative broad funding 
frameworks to ECO. Both require households to 
source the retrofitters themselves. In principle, 
this means that burdens like the search and 
administrative costs are no longer applicable 
and the margin for economic rent is smaller as 
households will look for the retrofitters that can 
deliver the best value for money. [In practice, we 
do not have information to actually models 
issues such as information asymmetries 
between suppliers and households.]  
The first approach we consider involves passing 
the entire cost of making the efficiency 
improvements to the beneficiaries. We assume 
(for simplicity) that these households will have 
access to interest-free loans with a 10-year 
repayment period to cover the costs. This gives 
us an extreme ‘framing’ case where the 
maximum gains from a loan approach could be 
achieved. In reality some interest would be 
involved (especially where loans are issued by 
private institutions) and, thus, household real 
income and economy-wide gains would be more 
limited (at least in the short term). We also make 
a ‘best case’ assumption that all loan funds are 
taken up by households exclusively the purpose 
of increasing energy efficiency. Generally, this 
allows to consider an upper ‘best’ case outcome 
for the loan scenario. We assume that 
repayments for each household only begin once 
that household has received the efficiency 
improvement. This means that the repayments 
exceed the duration of the enabling project 
activity. 
The other alternative we consider is a reference 
case where the costs of efficiency improvements 
are fully socialised via income tax. We label it as 
a reference case because we model the cost 
recovery through taxation as fully flexible in a way 
that would be unlikely in practice. The aim is to 
consider the difference in impacts when the 
government can increase tax (here income tax) 
to raise funds that can be offered to households 
as grants but then reverse this when the 
economy gains as a result. Because the grants 
are issued for a specific purpose, there is a net 
zero income effect for the households. That is 
they cannot spend the grant on anything else (i.e. 
we assume there can be no household ‘rent’).  
In both the ‘loans’ and ‘full socialisation of costs’ 
cases, £8.6billion are allocated to the UK 
Construction sector and a further £1.3billion to 
boiler manufacturers (again 75% going to the UK 
industry). The elimination of administrative 
costs4 leads to a smaller total cost for UK 
households of over £1billion. At the same time, 
because a larger amount is available for 
retrofitting (due to the absence of search costs 
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Figure 1: Comparison of GDP changes under different funding options (enabling 
and realising, forward-looking producers, equal distribution)
ECO (with economic rent) ECO (no rent present)
Interest-free loans to beneficiaries Fully socialising through income tax
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and economic rent), larger average efficiency 
gains can be expected. Again, we focus on 
scenario where we have an equal distribution of 
access to funding. But now each of ECO’s 
potential alternatives enables an energy 
efficiency improvement of 5.66% for each of the 
household quintiles. This represents a significant 
difference compared to the efficiency gains that 
could be realised through ECO, for the same 
distribution but a different level of funding 
dedicated to actually enabling energy efficiency 
improvements.  
Economy-wide impact of alternatives to 
ECO 
We begin by considering the enabling stage in 
isolation. An important thing to keep in mind 
when considering alternatives to ECO is that both 
loan repayments and tax payments precede any 
other payment. That is they must be met before 
any other spending. This is an important 
distinction: under ECO households have the 
option to adjust how they spend their income. 
That is, where ECO raises energy bills, 
households do have some choice in terms of 
choosing to use less energy. This is not an option 
when households have to meet their loan 
repayments or their tax payments, which means 
that their disposable income will be limited due 
to those payments. As a result, during the 
enabling stage, we observe potential negative 
income changes for all household quintiles for 
both potential alternatives to ECO.   
Our analysis shows that, before any energy 
efficiency gains are realised loan repayments 
can lead to a net drop in annual income of HG1 
of up to £22 per household in 2028, while the 
maximum annual income drop for any other 
household is £35 per household in HG5 in 2029. 
Despite the same loan repayments across all 
quintiles, more affluent households are also 
affected by the reduced activity observed across 
the economy during the enabling stage and 
suffer greater potential net income losses.  
On the other hand, using income tax to socialise 
the cost of efficiency improvements helps 
distribute the cost in a more progressive way. 
Here, in 2014 (the year that most funds are 
available), HG1 has a maximum drop in income 
of £7 per household, while households in HG5 
lose £136. In fact, as we go up in terms of gross 
annual income, we also see a larger income 
drop.  
The presence of negative outcomes at the 
enabling stage highlight the paramount 
importance of actually realising energy efficiency 
gains and triggering the household spending 
driven expansion that delivers sustained positive 
impacts on household incomes, employment 
and GDP. This is what helps mitigate, and 
ultimately offset, any negative income changes 
resulting from the need to pay for energy 
efficiency actions (the enabling stage). Indeed, 
when we consider both the enabling and 
realising stages together we see net positive 
income changes for all households across most 
of the programme timeframe and beyond. With 
the efficiency gains included in our results, HG1 
achieves a maximum sustained income boost of 
£64.39 per household. This maximum net gain 
is observed when the costs are socialised using 
income tax. This is a better outcome in terms of 
income boost compared to the best-case 
scenario ECO (£46.58 income boost per HG1 
household) and passing the cost to beneficiaries 
(£56.31 income boost per HG1 household). In 
fact,  within 5 years from the beginning of the 
efficiency improvement programme and over the 
long-run, socialising the costs through income 
tax enables greater income boosts for all 
household quintiles compared to any other 
funding approach we consider here.  
But it is important to note that a crucial 
difference between socialising the costs and 
using loans is due to how we have assumed 
income tax will adjust in what we have set out as 
a reference case. In the same way that the 
government raises the tax to cover the cost of 
grants, we assume that it maintains a balanced 
budget by reducing the income tax as soon as 
there are net positive revenues from the 
programme. This delivers a bigger boost to the 
incomes of households, which alongside the 
larger efficiency gains, leads to better long-term 
income results for all quintiles. However, those 
greater long-term income gains also mean 
temporary negative income changes for every 
household quintile, apart from HG1, in the short-
run and for a maximum of 2 years for HG4 and 
HG5. 
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The potential for better household income 
outcomes from these alternatives of ECO could 
also translate to a greater economy-wide boost 
(see Figure 1). Using interest-free loans to cover 
the costs could ultimately lead to a maximum 
sustained GDP expansion of 0.17% relative to 
what the situation would be with no energy 
efficiency programme, and a net boost of 45,240 
full-time equivalent jobs. Socialising the cost 
delivers even better results, with a maximum 
sustained 0.25% GDP expansion over what it 
would otherwise be, accompanied by a net 
increase of 64,742 full-time jobs. In this case 
where the cost of energy efficiency is socialised 
via the income tax we observe societal returns 
that could ultimately reach 6.6 FTE jobs and 
£6.7million in additional (cumulative) GDP by 
2040 per £million of spending. This is a 
significant improvement over ECO (event the 
case when no rent is present). 
In considering the sectoral distribution of gains, 
it is important to consider whether capacity 
constraints lead to any net crowding out of 
activity. We find that the ‘shock’ here is relatively 
limited without lasting impacts on prices or 
competitiveness. Only the energy sectors are 
expected to suffer net losses in output and 
employment. But this is due to reduced demand 
driven by efficiency gains, rather than crowding 
out. On the other hand, the hospitality sectors 
provide an example of industries that may 
experience an increase in output and 
employment if households opt to spend their 
boosted real incomes in line with initial spending 
patterns. The magnitude of the impacts varies 
with the extent of efficiency gains. Figure 2 
demonstrates the different employment impacts 
in the UK sectors by the end of ECO or any 
alternatively funded efficiency improvement 
programme. It is useful to keep in mind here that 
how the funds are used is also affecting the 
impact on specific sectors. For instance, ECO 
funding includes search costs. These are used to 
employ specialist services to identify projects 
that could be supported. When loans are used as 
the funding mechanism, the beneficiaries are 
required to source the retrofitters and we 
assume, in the absence of any better information 
to frame our scenarios and for simplicity, that the 
search costs are no longer applicable.5 This 
underpins the difference between the two 
mechanisms in the Services sector in Figure 2. 
IV: Distributing access to funding 
Our focus so far has been on the case where 
access to funding is equally distributed across all 
households regardless of which income quintile 
they fall into. This enables the most positive 
economy-wide impacts.  
Now we consider an alternative approach where, 
from 2013 to 2017 we continue to assume that 
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Figure 2: Employment changes in 2028 due to different funding mechanisms by 
UK sector (forward-looking, compared to ECO, equal distribution)
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access to funds is equally distributed across all 
households, while from 2018 onwards, access to 
funds is distributed in a tapered way. This 
approach enables the lowest income households 
to have access to the majority of funds (54%) 
and, as we move to more affluent households, 
access is gradually reduced.6 The efficiency gain 
per beneficiary household remains 17.2% but 
the distribution across quintiles changes. 
Introducing a tapered distribution changes the 
nature and magnitude of some of the impacts 
observed so far. One of the most significant 
changes is on the  potential magnitude of 
negative income effects. In Section II we noted 
that if loans are used by beneficiaries to cover 
the retrofitting cost, there is the potential for 
income losses of £22 per HG1 household in 
2028 at the enabling stage. This could be taken 
to correspond to a situation where, for some 
reason (e.g. equipment does not work properly), 
efficiency gains are not actually realised. A 
tapered approach could amplify this because it 
allocates more funds to HG1. That is, these low 
income households are required to cover higher 
loan repayments. Thus, if efficiency gains do not 
follow, the potential HG1 income losses in 2028 
increase to £58 per household, while HG5 may 
experience potential losses up to £18 per 
household in 2029. In short, the lowest income 
households may experience greater net income 
losses under a loans framework. This is in 
contrast to ECO, where our simulations suggest 
that, despite the need to pay for efficiency gains 
that may not yet be fully realised, the lowest 
income households will not suffer net income 
losses in any timeframe.  
When we consider the realising stage of each 
efficiency improvement programme, the 
difference in access to funding also translates to 
differences in potential efficiency gains.  Under a 
tapered approach, using ECO may deliver HG1 
efficiency gains equating to a 4.37% reduction in 
average energy use across the entire quintile (in 
the presence of significant rent), while the 
potential HG5 efficiency gains map to just 1.33% 
savings. When no rent is present, HG1 efficiency 
gains map to 8.53% savings and HG5 efficiency 
gains to 2.59%. On the other hand, when we 
consider the potential alternatives to ECO the 
HG1 efficiency gains may translate to 10.14% 
savings across HG1, while the HG5 can reach 
3.29%. 
Comparing the potential efficiency gains under a 
tapered approach to the ones enabled through 
an equal distribution it can be seen that HG1 is 
significantly better off in the tapered approach. 
HG2 may also achieve slightly bigger efficiency 
gains and energy savings across the quintile 
while every other household quintile can achieve 
small gains compared to what is achieved if 
funds/projects are equally distributed. The 
variation in energy savings resulting from 
efficiency gains translate to differences in the 
extent of real income boosts for all household 
quintiles. Socialising the retrofitting costs 
through the income tax with a tapered 
distribution, HG1 gets a greater sustained £94.5 
per household boost, over £30 more than if we 
impose an equal distribution. See Figure 3. On 
the other hand, HG3-5 achieve smaller efficiency 
gains under a tapered approach and therefore 
observe smaller income gains. As shown in 
Figure 3 as we move towards households that 
are more affluent there is a noteworthy gap 
between the tapered and the equal distribution.  
What happens to the macroeconomic impacts? 
The key point is that while HG1-2 gain most, they 
consume less. Thus, a smaller demand boost for 
goods and services is triggered. This translates 
to smaller economy-wide impacts being 
observed when a tapered distribution of funding 
for energy efficiency is introduced. In fact, where 
the distribution of energy efficiency funding is 
tapered in favour of low income households and 
costs are fully socialised via the income tax, a 
maximum sustained GDP expansion of 0.23% is 
achieved, accompanied by a net increase of 
59,365 new full-time jobs than if the funds are 
distributed equally. The dampening of economy-
wide impacts equates to a GDP gain that is 
0.02% points smaller, with 5,377 fewer full-time 
jobs. The per £million returns fall to 6 full-time 
jobs, while the cumulative GDP returns are 
£6.9million in 2040, slightly higher than the 
equal distribution at this  specific point but 
gradually equal distribution delivers greater per 
£million cumulative GDP returns (see Table 2 in 
Annex B). The fact that under a tapered 
distribution we observe smaller GDP and 
employment gains, is the reason why HG2 
achieves marginally smaller income gains 
compared to the equal distribution (£95.66 
rather than £97.81 per household) despite the 
larger efficiency gains. However, a tapered 
distribution helps prevent the net negative 
income changes suffered by HG2 in the first year 
of the programme observed in the non-tapered 
case. 
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V: Conclusions 
Our analysis demonstrates that energy efficiency programmes have the potential to deliver positive 
outcomes both in terms of an economy-wide boost and how the disposable incomes of households are 
impacted. As a funding mechanism, ECO enables these gains to be achieved without the potential for 
net income losses for the lowest income households at any point. Our findings indicate that even if ECO 
did not deliver any efficiency gains, no net negative GDP or employment changes are observed, and any 
potential net income losses are temporary, short scale and mainly confined at middle and high-income 
households. On the other hand, the administrative and search costs, and the potential for substantial 
economic rent extraction associated with ECO introduce limitations on the extent of efficiency gains – 
the real source of sustained economic expansion – that can be achieved using the level of funding 
available. In short, ECO delivers smaller economy-wide gains compared to what could be possible if the 
same amount was used exclusively for retrofitting properties.  
Of all the funding mechanisms we consider here, fully socialising the cost via income tax delivers the 
best high-level economic outcomes. This is because, while increased income tax requirements may have 
negative real income effects in the short to medium term, the economic expansion triggered by enabling 
energy efficiency gains ultimately allows the tax shock to be reversed, with potential reduction of income 
tax demands relative to what they were later on. This is what ultimately generates even greater real 
income boosts to all households.  
On the other hand, this outcome must be considered in the context of the temporary net income losses 
for many households. We find these losses accrue to those in the three highest income quintiles (HG3-
5), and also to those in the second lowest quintile, HG2, where access to funds to enable energy 
efficiency is distributed equally (we do not find any income losses for HG1). Furthermore, if for whatever 
reason efficiency gains are not achieved as a result of spending, every alternative to ECO that we consider 
here could potentially drive substantial and long lasting (over 20 years) income losses for all households. 
At macroeconomic level, this also translates to potential for negative GDP and employment changes.  
These are important considerations for policy makers. Is it better to continue with ECO, which, while 
delivering smaller economy-wide gains, does not ultimately have any net negative impacts on the wider 
economy and limits any negative income effects to middle and higher income households, for a period 
of not more than 3 years? Or should they opt for an alternative approach that may deliver better economy-
wide outcomes but, unless the efficiency gains are fully realised, may negatively affect both the wider 
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Figure 3: Evolution of HG1,3&5 disposable income when retrofitting costs fully 
socialised under different funding allocation approaches (forward-looking 
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economy and real incomes across all household income groups for long periods (potentially exceeding 
20 years)? 
Our work also highlights how the extent and nature of wider economy and household real income impacts 
are sensitive to what we assume about how access to funding is distributed across different household 
income groups (here quintiles). We find that distributing funds equally across different household income 
groups has the potential to deliver the best economy-wide gains. On the other hand, a tapered approach 
that provides greater access to funding to the lowest income households has the potential to deliver 
better real income results for these more vulnerable households, but at the expense of reduced economy-
wide gains. 
More generally, our work highlights the trade-offs between different funding mechanisms and different 
distributions of access to funds. We find that ECO is the safer approach as it does not deliver net negative 
impacts at a macroeconomic level at any point and only causes minimal short-term negative impacts to 
the incomes of middle and higher households. Greater economy-wide returns can be achieved if 
households can directly source energy efficiency projects with finance through loans or grants funded 
through the income tax system. But if households do not actually realise the expected efficiency gains, 
there is potential for negative economy-wide effects and significant income losses across all households. 
Similarly, giving all households equal access to funds may enable the largest economy-wide benefits, 
while tapering the availability of funds in favour of lower income households will deliver greater real 
income gains to them, but at the expense of smaller economy-wide gains. Thus, a key message from this 
work is that it is important to clearly identify the goals of energy efficiency improvement policies. Our 
analysis demonstrates that no combination of the options we considered is clearly better than the others 
in terms of delivering economy-wide gains at the same time as avoiding real income losses particularly 
to low income households. 
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Annex A: Brief description of the UKENVI CGE model and data for 
scenarios 
Model and scenario data 
In this work we use the UKENVI multi-sector computable general equilibrium, CGE, model of the UK 
economy. The model is fully specified and detailed in Lecca et al.( 2014) and Figus et al. (2017), where 
the latter introduces the household disaggregation used here to considered distribution effects. UKENVI 
is currently calibrated on a 2010 social accounting matrix (SAM) that incorporates an estimated industry-
by-industry input-output (IO) table (to be updated when more recent data are published by ONS). Here 
we explain some key characteristics of the model that are particularly important for the analysis 
conducted here. 
The data on the funding available through ECO are taken from the 2019 edition of BEIS Household Energy 
Efficiency Statistics (HEES). The information available in this publication detail the ECO spending up until 
2018 so for the period 2019-2028 we assume fixed funding availability each year, equal to the amount 
available in 2018. Through HEES we also obtain information on the number of households that received 
efficiency improvements. This way we can determine the amount allocated per beneficiary household 
and through that the number of beneficiary households in the period 2019-2028. Using the number of 
beneficiary households we can also identify what share of each household quintile is receiving efficiency 
improvements.  
 
Table 1: Summary of data used to inform scenarios 
      
  ECO (with 
economic rent) 
ECO (no rent 
present) 
Loans to 
beneficiaries 
Fully socialising 
through income 
tax 
Amount Spend on 
Constructions (% of 
total) 
  3,567.84 (33%) 6,957.29 (64%) 8,569.84 (87%) 8,569.84 (87%) 
Amount Spend on 
Boiler manufacturers 
(% of total) 
  644.06 (6%) 1,255.91 (12%) 1,255.91 (13%) 1,255.91 (13%) 
Economic rent (% of 
total) 
  4,001.30 (37%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 
Search costs (% of 
total) 
  1,612.54 (14%) 1,612.54 (14%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 
Administrative costs 
(% of total) 
  1,071.28 (10%) 1,071.28 (10%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 
Total cost paid by 
consumers 
  
                    
10,897.03  
                    
10,897.03  
                       
9,825.75  
                       
9,825.75  
Total efficiency gains 
when access 
distributed equally (in 
%) 
HG1-5 
(per 
household 
quintile) 
2.38% 4.64% 5.66% 5.66% 
Total efficiency gains 
with tapered 
distribution(in %) 
HG1 4.37% 8.53% 10.14% 10.14% 
HG2 2.44% 4.76% 5.79% 5.79% 
HG3 1.91% 3.73% 4.61% 4.61% 
HG4 1.85% 3.62% 4.47% 4.47% 
HG5 1.33% 2.59% 3.29% 3.29% 
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For the efficiency improvement of each more efficient household we use data from the National Energy 
Efficiency Data (NEED) framework. NEED reports the mean energy savings for a range of implemented 
retrofitting activities. We use the one reported for ‘Condensing Boiler and Cavity Wall Insulation and Loft 
Insulation’ as an indication of the efficiency achieved per more efficient household. The data cover the 
period 2013-2016 so for the 2017-2028 period we assume that the efficiency gains are the average of 
the 2013-2016 period. Although there is some variation in the efficiency gains of each beneficiary 
household in the period 2013-2016, which is reflected on our analyses, the average efficiency gains per 
beneficiary household across the 2013-2028 period is 17.2%. We use this figure and the share of 
households in each quintile that receive an improvement to determine the efficiency improvement of the 
whole quintile. For example, if in 2019 75,750 households in HG1 receive efficiency improvements this 
is 1.39% of HG1. With each beneficiary household being 17.2% more efficient, this means that the whole 
quintile is on average 0.24% (17.2% x 1.39%) more efficient. Adding together the efficiency gains of each 
year gives us the total efficiency gains of the entire programme (see Table 1).  
Which sectors are included?  
The general equilibrium framework incorporates all sectors of the UK economy. This allows analysis to 
capture interactions between the different sectors and markets and identify how changes in one sector 
can spill across the entire UK economy through changes in prices and incomes generated in different 
markets and the availability of constrained supplies of labour and capital. We aggregate the 103 sectors 
reported in ONS IO accounts to 30 sectors. This includes five energy supply sectors: coal extraction, crude 
oil extraction, refined petroleum, electricity and gas distribution sectors. The aggregation (or not) of the 
other 25 sectors permits key activities impacting or impacted by the response to enabling and realising 
energy efficiency are distinguished. However, in some cases the IO classification still aggregates some 
important activities. For example, the ‘Manufacture of fabricated metal products, excluding weapons & 
ammunition’ sector (sector 25OTHER in SIC 2007) includes the production of gas boilers. In this work we 
use a similar aggregation to Figus et al. (2017), with the differences being the disaggregation of 
Manufacture of fabricated metal products, excluding weapons & ammunition’ sector from the aggregated 
‘Iron, Steel and Metal’ sector in Figus et al. (2017) and the further aggregation of ‘Recreational’ and 
‘Other Private Services’ sectors.  
How is production activity modelled? 
Each industry has a production function that incorporates labour, capital, energy and non-energy 
intermediate inputs. Capital, labour and intermediates are standard input classification in every CGE 
model, including the one used by HM Treasury. The key difference is that in our model we distinguish 
between energy and non-energy intermediates. Capital and labour are combined in one nest of a CES 
consumption function to produce value added before combining with intermediates, dependent on 
relative prices. Here, we assume a fixed nominal wage and also a fixed (national) labour supply, meaning 
there cannot be any migration to cover the excess labour demand. The base year data incorporate a 
small (6%) pool of unemployed labour that responds to additional employment opportunities and through 
which the labour demand is covered. We assume perfect mobility of employees to other sectors where 
increased demand for their output also leads to increased labour demand. Capital is also constrained in 
that it does not instantly reach the desired level. Instead, as detailed by Figus et al. (2017), the path of 
the necessary investment to the desired capital stock is calculated so that it maximises the value of the 
firms, while taking into account the depreciation of existing capital. 
How is consumption modelled? 
Our model includes a number of consumers including the government and households. In our model, the 
government consumption is treated as exogenous meaning that despite any changes in relative prices 
the government is assumed to maintain the same level of consumption. This affects the budget balance, 
but in most simulations the government can accumulate savings or deficit. The only scenario where we 
assume a balanced budget is when we simulate the full socialisation of the cost of efficiency 
improvements through the income tax. In that case the government still maintains the same level of 
consumption but adjusts the income tax either up or down to achieve a balanced budget.  
The households are disaggregated into 5 quintiles based on their gross income, as detailed in Figus et 
al. (2017). This allows us to study how households with varying income levels differ in their consumption 
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of goods and services, including energy goods and services. Household income comes from different 
sources, including labour income, income from capital and transfers from the government. The marginal 
propensity to consume is assumed to be constant throughout the duration of our analyses. The initial 
consumption choices of each quintile are informed by the SAM data used as the basis for this model. 
However, the households respond to changes in the relative price of goods and services, so that they can 
maximise their utility; subject to budget constraints that fluctuate with every simulated period. This 
includes the consumption of residential energy, i.e. the energy required for households to run their 
properties and an efficiency parameter on energy use is shocked in our scenarios. As such our analyses 
capture any indirect rebound effects driven by a drop in the relative price of residential energy or by a 
general increase in the disposable income of households which increases the consumption demand of 
all goods and services. 
Are there imports/exports in UKENVI? 
UKENVI includes two external regions; Rest of EU (REU) and Rest of the World (ROW). Goods and services 
from these external regions can be imported for intermediate or final use and similarly UK industries 
have the option to export their output to these regions. UK goods and services are considered imperfect 
substitutes to those produced abroad and both import and export demands respond to changes in 
relative prices. In each simulated period firms can choose to either use domestically produced 
intermediate inputs or import them from abroad. However, since they are considered as imperfect 
substitutes, a greater difference in relative prices is required for the UK firms to opt to use imports rather 
than use domestic goods and services. A similar process applies to consumers, who have the option to 
meet their needs by using domestic or imported goods and services. The elasticity we assume between 
domestic and imported goods is in line with the existing literature and is generally accepted as being a 
reasonable assumption. However, a sensitivity analysis can be conducted by introducing different 
elasticities to reflect consumers of firms more or less prone to import the goods they need and how export 
demand does respond to changes in the competitiveness of UK industries. 
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Annex B: Summary of key results 
 
 
Table 2: Impact on key macroeconomic variables due to ECO and fully socialising the cost of energy efficiency 
           
   
ECO (with economic rent) ECO (no rent present Loans to beneficiaries 
Fully socialising through 
income tax 
  
Base values First year 
Full 
adjustment 
First year 
Full 
adjustment 
First year 
Full 
adjustment 
First year 
Full 
adjustment 
GDP   £1,305,907m 0.02% 0.07% 0.04% 0.14% 0.04% 0.17% -0.01% 0.25% 
CPI   1 0.06% 0.00% 0.08% 0.00% 0.04% 0.00% -0.02% 0.00% 
Investment   15% 0.04% 0.08% 0.06% 0.15% -0.03% 0.18% 0.18% 0.27% 
Unemployment rate   6% -0.60% -1.23% -1.06% -2.35% -1.03% -2.84% 0.14% -4.07% 
Employment   24,930,573 0.04% 0.08% 0.07% 0.15% 0.07% 0.18% -0.01% 0.26% 
Real wage   1 0.06% 0.00% 0.08% 0.00% 0.04% 0.00% -0.02% 0.00% 
Imports   £452,832m 0.07% 0.08% 0.14% 0.15% 0.13% 0.18% -0.02% 0.27% 
Exports   £452,832m -0.05% 0.00% -0.08% 0.00% -0.07% 0.00% 0.02% 0.00% 
Total energy use   £190,271m -0.09% -0.22% -0.10% -0.42% -0.04% -0.51% -0.07% -0.43% 
Disposable income (excluding 
savings)   £1,427,453m 0.01% 0.14% 0.03% 0.28% 0.06% 0.33% 0.03% 0.39% 
Household total energy 
consumption   £38,856m -0.36% -0.56% -0.40% -1.08% -0.13% -1.31% -0.27% -1.17% 
Residential energy consumption   £32,019m -0.13% -0.27% -0.15% -0.53% -0.05% -0.64% -0.11% -0.54% 
Cumulative GDP per £million 
spent   0 £0.03m £4.31m £0.04m £8.20m £0.05m £9.83m -£0.01m £14.10m 
Employment per £million spent   0 0.88 FTE 1.80 FTE 1.55 FTE 3.43 FTE 1.66 FTE 4.60 FTE -0.22 FTE 6.59 FTE 
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Endnotes 
1 A future focus of our scenario analysis could extend to consider the impact of some of the rent embodied 
in ECO accruing to households. 
2 Please note that Annex B reports the funding breakdown across the entire period 2013-2028 and 
includes a mixture of reported and estimated figures. As a result the percentage share of each cost 
associated with the delivery of ECO is slightly different compared to what is expected for ECO3. 
3 Any direct rebound effect should be captured in the direct energy saving data reported in the National 
Energy Efficiency Data (NEED) framework, which we use to inform the economy-wide scenario simulations 
of efficiency gains realised. Any indirect/economy-wide rebound are then captured through our general 
equilibrium analysis. 
4 It is important to highlight that any alternative funding mechanism may have associated administrative 
costs that could increase the total cost. However, in the absence of any information we assume that 
there are no administrative costs. 
5 In future research we aim to incorporate more behavioural features and dynamics into UKENVI. This 
will potentially include the impact of information asymmetries, but, as with all scenario simulations, what 
can be modelled is dependent on information available. 
6 Under the tapered approach HG1 has access to 54% of the funds, HG2 21%, HG3 12%, HG4 11% and 
HG5 2%. This breakdown was provided by our colleagues at BEIS and are the outcome of internal 
analyses/modelling. 
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